

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this](#) [page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03ANKARA7767, TURKEY REACTS TO THE ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#03ANKARA7767**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
03ANKARA7767	2003-12-19 08:43	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Ankara

Appears in these articles:

[www.tanea.gr](#)

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007767

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013

TAGS: [CY](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: TURKEY REACTS TO THE ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

REF: ANKARA 7662

(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Close results in northern Cyprus' December 14 elections have unleashed a wave of speculation about their meaning and possible coalitions on both sides in Turkey's Cyprus debate. However, amid the media hype there is a clear sense that all eyes are now on Ankara. Ankara's EU diplomats are still digesting the results and have no post-election action plan to engage the Turks. MFA officials expressed to visiting UK officials hope for a broad-based coalition government with which the GOT could negotiate without worrying about being accused of a sellout. As it had with Ambassadors Edelman and Westmacott on the eve of the elections, the MFA sketchily outlined its plans to move forward to re-start negotiations. End Summary.

Election Results Fodder for Both Sides

¶2. (U) The election results have prodded both the pro- and anti-Denktaş media to think harder about Cyprus than in the past. Consistently pro-Denktaş leftist-nationalist Cumhuriyet, under the banner headline "Peace Offensive from Denktaş", called the elections a "lesson in democracy." However, even Cumhuriyet's hard-core socialist-nationalist columnist Hikmet Cetinkaya hinted at the question of poverty and corruption under Denktaş in his Dec. 17 column. A range of columnists in other papers, including establishmentarians

like Murat Yetkin in Radikal, are urging the GOT to take advantage of the opening to solve the Cyprus question. Most pro-settlement columnists believe that the election results have created more maneuvering space for the GOT to reach a settlement and increased GOT leverage on the "TRNC." The Turkish press has also picked up on the dramatic increase in opposition votes over the last election as a signal of dissatisfaction with the Denktash status quo. The media is awash in speculation about the possible permutations for coalitions and the effects upon a possible solution. But while media predictions vary wildly, there is a clear sense that all eyes are on Ankara.

No EU Post-Election Action Plan on Turkey

13. (C) With the exception of the UK, Ankara's EU diplomats are still digesting the election results and, like the media, are caught up in speculation about possible coalitions. Seen from Ankara, there is no EU plan for engaging the Turks on Cyprus. Asked what the EU's action plan is, the Dutch DCM shook his head and wished the EU had one; the German political counselor said the EU does not need an action plan -- Cyprus is Turkey's problem.

14. (C) Ankara's EU diplomats are uncertain about the effect of Cyprus settlement on Turkey's accession hopes. Most agree that lack of a settlement will be fatal. However, the Irish DCM claimed Turkey could still receive a date to begin accession negotiations without settlement on Cyprus, although he admitted it would be difficult. Several others speculated that concern about Cyprus would get lost in December 2004 amid concerns about an EU Constitution and the recent admission of 10 new members. Nor is there unanimity among Ankara's EU diplomats on the criteria the EU will use in December 2004 to determine whether Turkey's performance on Cyprus is satisfactory. Several recognized that, because the Cyprus question is not formally part of the political criteria, EU language on Cyprus is vague. However, they agreed that once the settlement process appears "irreversible", Turkey will have cleared the EU's Cyprus bar.

MFA Election Readout

15. (C) According to the UK Political Counselor, Turkish MFA U/S Ziyal and Deputy U/S Ilkin gave their election readouts to visiting UK Foreign Office Permanent U/S Jay on December 15. MFA spent much of the meeting asserting that the election in the North was free and fair. Ziyal averred that he had personally instructed Turkey's "Embassy" in the "TRNC" and Turkish military on the island not to interfere. The British side noted that NGOs had raised questions about fairness; the Turks charged that the NGOs were biased against the government parties and had given money to the opposition.

16. (C) Ziyal and Ilkin said they hope for a broad-based coalition government that will avoid past divisions. The GOT wants to be able to come to a solution without worrying about accusations of a sellout (of Denktash and Turkish honor) from important, disgruntled factions outside the AK government. U/S Ziyal interpreted the elections as showing that Turkish Cypriots are ready for a settlement, but not at any price. Turkey's Parliament will not settle for just anything, and the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) will ratchet up its rhetoric, he predicted. The government will have to expend much political capital to get a settlement approved. Another MFA official added that the AK government's calculations could be influenced by Turkey's March 28 local elections; according to the UK political counselor, the other Turkish officials quickly cut him off.

GOT Timeline for a Settlement

17. (S) Ilkin reviewed the GOT's envisioned timeline, as he had with Ambassadors Edelman and Westmacott on December 12 (reftel): the GOT will begin talks with Denktash in January, with an eye toward opening talks with the Greek Cypriots in the beginning of February. The GOT hopes for an agreed statement of basic principles and a basic government structure in place by late April. The GOT does not think it can finalize all aspects of the negotiations by May 1, but thinks it can have the basic settlement outline in place, Ilkin asserted. The GOT is amenable in principle to a referendum on the results of negotiations, but will not agree to a referendum without knowing what the text will be. Ilkin appealed to the British for help in pressuring the Greek Cypriot side once Turkey tables its proposal.

18. (C) Comment: Despite the clear sense that the ball is now in Ankara's court to make the next move toward a settlement, there is currently no public consensus about what constitutes an acceptable settlement. The GOT, relying to an extent on the expertise of MFA officials who themselves are in search of a way to break out of the 29-year stasis, wants a proposal that garners a degree of consensus. It has not yet fleshed one out. The lack of a clear plan is also due to entrenched opposition to a settlement from parts of the Turkish establishment which have enjoyed a cozy, mutually beneficial material relationship with Denktash. In any case, P.M. Erdogan will face a major leadership challenge in convincing the public to accept compromises on a question that for decades has been a hot button for Turkey's strong nationalism. End Comment.

EDELMAN